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TOWARD A EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF
APPELLATE COURTS
Hjalte Rasmussen*

EUROPEAN LAW AND THE INDIVIDUAL. Edited by F.G. Jacobs.
Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co. 1976. Pp. xi, 211.
$21.75.
The issue of individual rights has become one of substantial
interest and concern in the European Economic Community
(EEC), and it is the subject of this book. Although the book's title
is ambitious and the table of contents reveals that the' subject is
approached in a variety of ways, it can hardly be said that this
book covers all aspects of the rights of the individual under Community law. After all, if this book were really meant to explore
all the title implies, would it not ultimately be necessary to
describe the entire legal system of the Communities? Even if
measured by more modest standards, however, the book's coverage is far from all-embracing. Actually, as the Foreword suggests,
these ten papers, which were first presented at a workshop held
in 1975 by the University of London's Institute of Advanced
Legal Studies, concentrate on only two, albeit broad, facets of
individual rights. 1
Specifically, the essays emphasize that'aspect of Community
Law that could loosely be termed "social." In the interest of
precision, I should certainly mention, however, that one can find
in several of the essays, particularly in "The European Social
Charter," discussions of many important aspects of labor law.
* Visiting Research Scholar, University of Michigan. Law Degree 1966, University of
Copenhagen; Ph.D. 1975, University of Aarhus, Denmark.
1. The papers include The Legal Protection of Private Parties in the Law of the
European Communities, by W. van Gerven (pp. 1-17); ·The International Scope of the
Community Provisions Concerning Free Movements of Workers (with Special Reference
to the Law of the United Kingdom), by T.C. Hartley (pp. 19-37); An Incipient Form of
European Citizenship, by R. Plender (pp. 39-53); Conflicts of Law in Matters of Social
Security Under the EEC Treaty, by K. Lipstein (pp. 55-77); Recent Decisions of the Court
of Justice in the Field of Free Movement of Persons and Free Supply of Services, by P.
Leleux (pp. 79-93); The Mutual Recognition of Qualifications in the EEC, by R. Wagenbaur (pp. 95-112). Professors of Law Eric Stein and G. Joseph Vining, the only Americans
to participate in the workshop, co-authored Citizens' Access to Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Transnational and Federal Context (pp. 113-43). The remaining
papers are The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Community, by M. Hilf (pp. 14560); Remedies in the United Kingdom: Some Practical Problems of Direct Applicability,
by Solicitor Lawrence Collins (pp. 161-79); and The European Social Charter, by 0.
Kahn-Freund (pp. 181-211). The editor, Francis G. Jacobs, is Professor of Law at King's
College in London.
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Moreover, van Gerven's essay and Stein and Vining's contain
important contributions to the study of Community procedural
law. (I shall return to the latter in great detail below.)
In sum, the reader will find selective discussions of the substantive social and labor law, and of related aspects of the procedural law of the European Communities and other European
sources of law. 2 All the essays, according to the Foreword, are
concerned mainly with the gradual enlargement of the legal protection of the individual as a result of certain far-reaching decisions of the European Community's Court of Justice.
From what has already been said, it is obvious that I cannot
review all the essays without resorting to Procrustean techniques,
and the ten essays in this book certainly deserve better. For example, Trevor Hartley took up the problem of the international
effects of Community law on movements of workers when that
subject-matter was still an area of Community law largely unpenetrated by other scholars. Similarly, Hilfs "The Protection of
Fundamental Rights in the Community" embodied considerable
new information and research, for only shortly before he presented his paper had discussion begun about how and by whom
the fundamental rights of the individual should be protected
under Community law. Since the time of Hilfs essay, however,
the issue of fundamental rights has evoked perhaps the most
important developments in the Community and its law. 3
The other fine essays notwithstanding, the rest of this review
will look at the contribution of Stein and Vining. 4 Their question-why the Court of Justice has limited the access of private
parties to judicial review under article 173, paragraph 2, of the
2. "Community law" and the "Law of the Communities" are interchangeable with
"European law" and are often used in its stead. The term "European law" also embraces,
however, non-national European law which stems from sources other than the European
Communities. Although the foreword refers to the, subject of the book as "the area of
Community law which can loosely be called 'soc'ial,'" several of the essays concern
issues which would better be described as "European law." For instance, two of the essays
largely discuss laws of the United Kingdom. Collins, supra note 2; Hartley, supra note 2.
Also, Kahn-Freund's The European Social Charter, supra note 2, argues for the use of
the broader term "European law."
·
3. See, e.g., Golsong, 1st der Katalog der in Europii'isehen M enschenrechtskonuention
erhaltenen Grundrechte fur die EG anwendbar?, ZEITSCHRIFI' FOR GRUNDRECHTE 346-61
(1978); Schermers, The Communities Under the European Convention on Human Rights,
1978/1 LEGAL, lssUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 1; L'Indiuiduet le droit Europeen (1976)
(published papers from the Seventh International Congress for European Law held in
Brussels on oct. 2-4, 1976, under th auspices of the International Association for European
Law).
4. The chapter by Stein and Vining is also printed in 70 AM. J. INTL. L. 219 (1976).
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EEC Treaty-is among those which have caused the most gallons
of ink to flow. To my knowledge, however, they are the first to
attempt a full account of the reasons the Court may have had
when denying that access.
To answer the question whether the Court should change its
case law on this issue, it would seem of the greatest importance
to understand initially what the underlying rationale for its narrow definition of that access has been. Happily, the authors' catalogue of explanations is exceedingly thoughtful and broad in
perspective. Their comparative treatment of access to judicial
review of American and West German administrative actions
highly enriches their study. While I acknowledge my debt to Stein
and Vining for their pioneering effort, I must also admit my firm
belief that their catalogue of explanations needs both expansion
and modification. I even venture to suggest that the additional
explanation I shall propose may be the most crucial one to a
complete assessment of why the Court has denied standing to
private parties.
I contend that the Court's denial of direct access under article 173, paragraph 2, is part of a grandiose plan to modify the
Community's judicial system, and that the Court's ultimate goal
is to act as the supreme appellate Court of the Community. In
this design, the subordinate courts would be the courts and tribunals of the nine Member States and the special courts of first
instance which the Community might from time to time establish. I shall argue this hypothesis later. First I must establish
some preliminary points of law and fact. Furthermore, Stein and
Vining's presentation is so authoritative and thorough that I
must, in my view, meet their arguments before asserting my own.
Unlike the United States Constitution, which makes no provision for judicial ·review, the Treaties which established the
Western European Communities expressly authorize the Court of
Justice to rule on the validity of the Community's legal acts.
Article 173, paragraph 1, empowers the Member States and Community Institutions to file suit for annulment of such acts. Article
173, paragraph 2, governs the citizen's access to judical review.
Another rather significant difference between the United
States Constitution and the EEC Treaties is that the former
granted only a limited original jurisdiction in the United States
Supreme Court while e111powering Congress to vest in it appellate
jurisdiction. The latter, on the contrary, provide the Court of
Justice with a broad range of original powers but expressly forbid
it from hearing cases other than those the Treaties designate. The
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most important areas of the original jurisdiction granted by the
Treaty are: (1) cases challenging the legality of acts by Community Institutions (article 173); (2) cases alleging a failure to act
by one or more of the Community Institutions (article 175); (3)
damage claims against the Community for injuries caused by its
administrative and legislative acts (article 178); (4) claims by
employees of Community institutions against their employers
(article 179); 5 and (5) actions brought by the Commission or a
Member State against another Member State for a breach of a
treaty obligation (articles 169-171).
It is probably generally agreed that the Framers of the Treaty
envisioned these actions as the primary remedies available to
redress unconstitutional activities. However, to assure that the
law of the Treaty would be uniformly applied in all the Member
States, the Framers, in article 177, rested jurisdiction in the
Court of Justice to issue preliminary rulings. According to this
article, the courts of Member States may submit to the Court socalled preliminary questions about the interpretation of the
Treaty or the validity and the interpretation of the Community's
legal acts. In an unbroken line of precedents, the Court has interpreted article 177 as encouraging cooperation between Community and Member State courts, but not, at least in principle,
as allowing the Court to rule on the compatibility of national
legislation with Community law. When presented a preliminary
question, the Court of Justice is supposed to respond with an
abstract interpretation of the relevant Community law. Even
granting the Court's best intention not to trespass on the national
courts' exclusive jurisdiction to find facts and to apply Community law to the case at hand, the Court has never, for practical
reasons, been able to disregard totally the facts of a case. The
Court has, however, enjoyed the advantage in such cases (compared to cases it hears as first instance) that the facts will usually
have been properly established and thoroughly discussed before
the preliminary questions are submitted.
Turning our attention now to Stein and Vining's article, I
should begin by considering the extremely interesting finding
which led them to delve anew into the old question of the limitations on private parties' standing to sue under article 173. Highlighting judicial decisions in the Federal Republic of Germany
5. Approximately one-third of all the cases filed in the Court's register are "staff
cases" brought by Community personnel.
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and the United States, Stein and Vining establish that a citizen's
ability to trigger judicial review is quite broad "in these more or
less mature federations where the citizens are directly subject to
federal and state law." Why then is the Court of Justice so reluctant to extend the same protection to the European citizen? That
citizen is undeniably the subject of a common law which daily
affects him in a variety of important economic activities. Even if
the EEC is not a "mature federation," the Court has said that it
is "a new legal ordef' 6 and not just" a new legal order of international law," as Stein and Vining contend (p.115).
A short explanation is required with respect to the authors'
use of the term "administrative actions," for it is not at all clear
what the term means in Community law. Stein and Vining refrain from defining the notion, which presumably should. be distinguished from legislative action. Both the Council and the
Commission are empowered to legislate and administer, but remarkably, no one has attempted to determine authoritatively by
reference to origin, nature, or form precisely which acts are legislative and which are administrative. These conceptual difficulties
might explain why in a couple of instances the authors are less
stringent than would be expected in distinguishing the two kinds
of action (pp. 117 & 120).
The authors repeatedly allude to the Community's origin in
international law (p. 115), emphasizing in this way that the Community was created as a compact among sovereign states. Presumably these states, more or less instinctively, would have rejected the idea of giving private citizens standing before a nonnational court to claim rights vis-A-vis the states. Such a stateoriented philosophy might have inspired the Court to interpret
article 173, paragraph 2's standing requirements as narrowly as
possible. The "compact-among-states" argument also suggests
that the Court, given its modest background, should not dare to
interpret citizens' access in broader terms than those undoubtedly warranted by the textual limitations of that article. This
theory finds support in the Court's repeated statements that it is
bound by the "clearly restrictive wording of Article 173 para 2," 7
although on another occasion the Court declared that "the provision of the Treaty relevant to the right of action of the citizens
should not be narrowly interpreted." 8
6. See, e.g., Costa v. ENEL, [1964] E.C.R. 1141, [1964] C.M. L.R. 425.
7. See Sgarlata v. Commission, [1965] E.C.R. 279, [1966] C.M. L.R. 315.
8. See Plaumann & Co. v. Commission, [1963] E.C.R. 197, [1964] C.M. L.R. 29,
46.
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The authors, however, believe that the wording of article 173,
paragraph 2, contemplated in isolation, is ambiguous enough to
allow the Court considerable discretion to permit private standing to sue (p. 124). In this belief, they are no doubt right. Further,
considering how often the Court has tainted its interpretations of
the Treaty with interests other than those of the constituent
states, Stein and Vining are correctly unpersuaded by the Court's
textual argument. More precisely, the Court has often asserted its
will in contravention of the will of the Framers, as more or less
successfully expressed in the Treaty's different articles, and the
Court has accordingly often been charged with usurping legislative power and with disregarding the rights of the Member States.
Under these circumstances, one would certainly not be well advised to credit the Court's display of judicial modesty. Indeed,
one might note that lawyers, scholars, and even the Court's own
Advocates General have argued strongly for a broader definition
of the citizen's access to judicial review of administrative and
legislative action. Finally, whatever some of the Member States
may have felt about their time as completely sovereign states
under international law, the desirability of a strong Community
judiciary must have been ardently advocated during the negotia. tions which ultimately led to the establishment of the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The Framers must have had
at least two important concerns: to accord legal protection to the
individual who would be subject to the powers they were creating
and to create a judiciary strong enough to overcome what they
expected to be formidable opposition from various powerful interests to the enforcement of Community laws. The Framers could
have adopted the American solution by creating a hierarchy in
which the Court of Justice was the highest appellate court and
heard appeals from both federal courts and all the courts of the
Member States. A second solution would have been to let the
courts of the Member States enforce the common law, permitting
appeal to the Court of Justice on all matters involving Community law. A third, plainly somewhat less effective, solution is
the present one. If the present Court probably cannot assert itself
against opposing interests to meet all the Community's need for
a strong judiciary, it is nonetheless remarkably more powerful
than any traditional transnational court or tribunal. This is so,
not least, because the ECSC Court-and its successors-have an
express power of judicial review which, compared with that of
traditional non-nation courts, must be termed extraordinary.
Also, the standing requirements on which the ECSC Treaty
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conditions the citizen's right to trigger judicial review are not
unreasonably burdensome. Finally, the credibility of the "compact-among-states" argument suffers further by the fact that
article 173, paragraph 2, specifically provides that any citizen
"addressed" by an act of a Community institution may challenge
the validity of that act. Since that argument neither alone nor in
connection with the "textual" argument plausibly explains the
Court's narrow construction of the almost self-evident meaning of
article 173, paragraph 2's, standing requirement, the search for a
convincing rationale must continue.
Stein and Vining assume that the Court's interest in maintaining the delicate balance between the power of Member States
and of the Community accounts for its narrow construction of the
standing requirement of a showing of "direct concern"(p. 120).
They show that the Court's first French Advocate General, M.
Gand, urged the Court to demonstrate "diplomatic courtesy" by
not impairing state discretion and sovereignty. They properly
ask, however, whether "the Court [can] seriously assert respect
for States' rights and sovereignty when a plaintiff, claiming present harm, is offering to show that the contested Community act
is unlawful and thus cannot serve as the legal basis for further
state action?" (p.122). The answer clearly ought to be that it
cannot. Besides, it is unclear to me how the Court's annulment
of a Community Institution's act could seriously impair state
sovereignty.
One might recall at this point that the Court has never
earned high grades for diplomacy in its relations with Member
States. In fact, the Court has conceded surprisingly little to Member States in developing Community constitutional law. Moreover, occasional decisions that have appeared to defer to national
interests later turned out to concentrate further the power of
judicial review in the hands of the Court. With that note, I believe, we can leave the "sovereignty" arguments.
Stein and Vining suggest that the Court may be reluctant to
permit private parties access because it feels bound by a comparison of the relevant provisions of the ECSC and EEC treaties. The
more restrictive language of the EEC Treaty may have led the
Court to conclude that the Framers intended to restrict individual access, "presumably because of the much broader power to
issue general regulations granted to the EEC institutions and the
much wider range of persons affected by the EEC Treaty" (p.
117). In the words of the Court, the changed wording indicates the
Framers' intent not to accord the same protection under the EEC
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Treaty-and they clearly did not mean to accord more-even
though they were increasing both the Community's power and the
number of people affected. But it seems peculiar to me, to say the
least, to provide less protection in response to greater political
power. Equally peculiar is how, without stating it unambiguously, the Framers could have expected that intent to be followed by an independent judicial branch expressly vested with
the right to exercise judicial review. If broad democratic controls
had been simultaneously institutionalized at the Community
level, this hypothesis might command some greater credibility,
but no such attempt was ever made. Without such democratic
controls-and perhaps even with them-the Court would unacceptably cooperate with the political branches of government by
maintaining a Community governed not by law but by politicians. The Court would thereby manifestly disregard its article
164 duty to ensure "that in the interpretation and application of
this Treaty the law be observed." The "more power, less control"
argument therefore cannot be accepted as a valid explanation.
Perhaps the Court's unwillingness to permit direct private
actions questioning the validity of Community acts is due to some
fear that, by overturning a decision forged in the Council of Ministers by political compromise, the Court might paralyze the
Council's ability to make decisions. This is not a risk, the argument would contend, that the Court should run. But this argument is improbable. First, there is no evidence that the Court
shows any specific hesitance to strike down fragile political compromises where their validity is questioned under the preliminary-question procedure of article 177. Why then should the
Court hesitate more to invalidate such an act directly? Second,
to the extent the Court does take into account the instability that
might result from invalidating a political compromise, it properly
ought to and in fact does so when deciding the substance of the
case.
Moreover, the EEC Council's practice of deciding questions
unanimously, one might argue, ought to lead the Court to interpret citizens' access in broader terms, since there is little chance
that any of the Member States which have been deeply involved
in the horsetrading would subsequently question the validity of
their compromise in an article 173 action. Nor is there any particular reason to believe that the EEC Commission would use its
power to trigger judicial review. Statistics clearly prove both
these points.
These considerations amply support Stein and Vining's
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rejection of the "political compromise" argument. To be sure,
their rejection assumes that relatively insignificant Council actions, routine regulations, and other "only" administrative acts
are often of little political import. The points I have made, however, are no less valid with respect to actions against genuinely
legislative acts.
In their search for a rationale, Stein and Vining then suggest
"that the inherent aversion of administrators everywhere . . . to
judicial control" may explain the Court's reluctance to allow individuals standing (p.123). The authors might have added that the
Council is not only an administrative agency, but the Community's foremost political organ. Since its decisional process
presumably would be inhibited if decisions might later undergo
judicial scrutiny on private initiative, the Council would disfavor
a broad right to judicial review. The authors note that attorneys
for the Council and the Commission "have been uncompromising
and consistent in their opposition to plaintiff standing" (p.123).
They add that even the United States Supreme Court would
hesitate to decide a controversial case against both Congress and
the Executive (p.123).
Addressing the latter argument first, I would retort that one
ought to be especially cautious in arguing by analogy from the
American experience in this particular respect. The European
Court's express power of judicial review has no equivalent in the
United States Constitution; the Supreme Court exercises judicial
review only as a matter of constitutional practice, however wellestablished that practice might be.
If the attorneys for Community ·Institutions favor a very narrow interpretation of the standing requirements, commentators
have almost unanimously taken the opposite view. The Court's
Advocates General have likewise supported plaintiffs' claims that
the Court should at least hear the substance of their cases. In any
case, since no empirical evidence supports this "administrator's
aversion" argument, its bearing on the Court's rationale is probably not strong.
One potential difficulty that confronted the Community in
its formative years was that most of its subjects lacked loyalty to
it or a serise of solidarity with its fate. Powerful companies and
interest groups presumably would not have been expected to permit the Community to curtail their freedom; they would combat
the new body with all available means. One means of opposition
would be to seek judicial review frequently, even in frivolous
cases.
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It is far from evident that these fears lacked substance. In
fact, experience under the ECSC's more liberal provision for individual access to judicial review justifies the fears that foes of the
Community would abuse the liberal access to judicial review.
Presumably such abuse was prompted by the belief that as long
as the validity of Community acts was subject to litigation, it
would be difficult, if not impossible, to enforce them. Such abuse
could have proved catastrophic for the young Community, which
needed all the legitimacy successful enforcement could provide it.
The result would have been a vicious circle operating in favor of
th~ Community's foes. 9 Thus, in the early 1960s, when the first
annulment cases were filed against the Community, considerations of legitimacy may have influenced the Court to deny almost
totally a citizen's right to standing.
What is the situation today? I feel that the Community has
been sufficiently successful to generate a not insubstantial loyalty
and solidarity. If my assessment is correct, the Court has considerably less need today to interpret the standing requirements
narrowly. The Court has shown no signs, however, that it is reconsidering its interpretation.
If the standing requirements were interpreted more liberally,
the Court would not, in my opinion, have to wait long for cases.
Presumably, the Court's interpretation of those requirements has
deterred a good deal of litigation. Parenthetically, therefore, I
disagree with Stein and Vining when they suggest that the Community's regulatory power is too limited in scope to produce
enough pressure on the Court to redefine its standing requirements (p.125).
Precedent, unbroken for more than fifteen years, indicates
that the Court is unwilling to ease the citizen's access to judicial
review, no matter how many litigants knock on the Court's door.
This is presumably so because the Court evidently has a longterm interest in reshaping the judiciary of the Community to
allow itself to act as the high appellate court of Community law,
with the courts and tribunals of Member States and any administrative and other courts which the Community might create acting as courts of first instance. This interest weighs against the
citizen's interest .in a direct access to the Court. Considerable
9. The authors point out on page 116 that "in the Communities the institutions are
brittle and as yet have little grass roots participation" whereas "[i]n the United States
there is little question about the basic legitimacy of the governmental institutions ••• ,"
The authors, however, do not relate this observation to their search for a rationale for the
Court's negative attitude toward standing for private individuals.
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empirical evidence supports this hypothesis.
First, the Court not only restricts the citizen's access to judicial review of legislative and administrative acts; it also restricts
the right of private individuals under article 175·, paragraph 3, to
seek an injunction against an institution which disregards an
obligation to act under Community law. Several individuals have
sought such injunctions, but the Court has dismissed all of the
suits, primarily on the ground that the parties did not satisfy the
article's standing requirement. The importance of the Court's
denials of access to private parties lies in the virtual absence of
litigation between the Member States and Community Institutions under articles 173 and 175: The Court has reduced to an
absolute minimum the number of cases brought under these articles, thereby reducing the frequency with which, pursuant to the
Treaty, it must act as a court of first instance.
Second, for many years, the Court was equally unsympathetic to damage suits brought under article 178, in most instances on the grounds that they attempted to circumvent
article 173's narrow standing requirements. 10 In the early 1970s
the Court ostensibly shifted its position, more liberally interpreting the provisions that allow private persons to sue the
Community for damages. 11 Despite this apparent shift, the Court
has, for two reasons, clearly disappointed the expectations of private plaintiffs. First, the Court defined the conditions for Community liability so narrowly that no private party has yet been
awarded damages. 12 Second, the Court har;; found alternative
means to inhibit private suits. For example, in suits alleging that
a government agency has denied the plaintiff a benefit on the
basis of an illegal Community law, the Court has held that since
the allegedly injurious decision was made by a national agency,
the plaintiff must first sue the national government in its own .
courts. Once again the Court's desire to have another court act
in the first instance as judge of both law and fact is clearly discernible.
The denial of a remedy under article 173 is thus parallelled
by the unavailability of remedies under articles 175 and 178. This
10. van Gerven, The Legal Protection of Private Parties, in EUROPEAN LAw AND
1, 9 (F. Jacobs ed. 1976).
11. Id. at 11.
12. See, e.g., Firma Bayerische HNL. Vermehrungsbetriebe GmbH v. The Counsil
and the Commission, No. 83, 94/76 & 4, 15, 40/77 [1978] E.C.R. 1209 (May 25, 1978),
where the Court rejected a damage claim for losses suffered by the plaintiff as a result of
enforcement of a regulation· which the Court earlier had annulled on equal protection
grounds.

THE INDIVIDUAL
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parallelism strongly supports, in my opinion, the validity of the
hypothesis that these denials are but elements of the Court's
overall plan to establish itself as a sort of high appellate court
on matters of Community law.
A memorandum prepared by the Court in 1978 also supports
my hypothesis. The memorandum was intended to convince the
Council of Ministers of the need for basic changes in the Court's
powers, organization, and procedures. The Court stated:
At the present time the Court is one of the first and last
instance in all cases. For staff cases steps are already being taken
to set up an administrative tribunal of first instance against whose
decisions an appeal will lie to the Court only on a point of
law. . . .
The Court accepts that it should retain its present jurisdiction
in cases such as against Member States for failure to fulfill Treaty
obligations, actions for annullment brought by Member States or
Community Institutions and-in any event-references for preliminary rulings. On the other hand it may be thought that certain
other categories"Of cases-such as cases brought by private persons
in competition matters [articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty] or
for ·damages [articles 178 and 215 of the Treaty] might in future
be the. subject of an arrangement similar to that at present envisaged for staff cases.

It is clear, I believe, that the Court should remain the sole
judge of cases brought against Member States for Treaty infractions. What the Court seeks in its memorandum, therefore, is to
be released from its remaining duties as a court of first instance.
It would like to avoid its present duty to act as such a court in
cases where a Community Institution specifically addresses its
decision to the plaintiff (article 173); the Commission's decisions
in antitrust cases under articles 85 and 86 ·are the only really
important cases in this category. The Court would also prefer that
a lower court first hear and decide claims for damages. The
Court's proposal to have "staff cases" removed from its docket
has already been implemented, although the administrative tribunal established for that purpose is not yet functioning.
By implication, the memorandum suggests the Court is willing to act as a court of first instance in the other areas enumerated in the Treaty but·not discussed in the memorandum. It is
reasonable to assume that this willingness is intimately connected with its belief that in these remaining areas it has succeeded in limiting the number of such cases to the necessary
minimum.
In sum, injured private parties have no choice but to file suit
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before their own national courts. In turn, the national courts
should, in the opinion of the Court of Justice, seek preliminary
rulings under article 177 where the Court's interpretation of relevant Community law is desirable or required by law. The national
courts should also refer to the Court for decision all questions
about the validity of Community acts.
In theory, then, the national courts will try most cases on
their merits, and the Court of Justice will be the ultimate arbiter
on questions of law. It is no secret, however, that·when making
preliminary rulings the Court often transgresses this abstract borderline between the two jurisdictions. Often the Court sufficiently
weaves together its analysis of questions of law and its consideration of facts that the national judge has little flexibility in making
his final decision. 13
The Court's memorandum mirrors this view when it suggests
that the proposed reforms would have the advantages
not only of bringing the Community judicial system more into line
with those of the Member States but also-and above all-of making the Court to a large extent the judge of questions of law rather
than of fact so concentrating its activities on what is its true and
main role within the framework of the Community. The function
of the Court would thus be limited in this field to hearing appeals
on questions of law brought before it against decisions of the new
court of first instance. 14

One important reason for the Court's desire to limit its role
to deciding questions of law is its multilingual nature. For instance, the Danish government insists on using Danish whenever
it appears before the Court as a party or intervenor. Imagine the
difficulties if a witness does not understand the language of the
examining attorney. Even more difficult are cases requiring simultaneous translation; in some situations, the spoken language
cannot be translated directly into the desired languages because,
for technical reasons, it must first be interpreted into certain
intermediate languages.
Even disregarding the linguistic hurdles that confront the
13. It may be more than mere coincidence that in very recent decisions the Court
refrains from discussing article 177's underlying assumption of cooperation between the
Court and the courts of Member States. See, e.g., Pigs Marketing Board, No. 83/78 (Ct.
of Justice for European Communities, Nov. 11, 1978). Professor Gerhard Casper has said
"that the Court ... had demonstrated the ease with which article 177 could be turned
into a vehicle for appellate review." 1978 PRoc. AM. Socv. !NTL. L. 171.
14. (Emphasis added). The Ministers actually disapproved the Court's proposals.
Declaration of Oct. 9, 1978.
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Court, fact-finding, as everyone knows, can be extremely timeconsuming. Statistics show that the cases which the Court hears
as a court of first instance consume considerably more time than
cases involving preliminary rulings. On the average, the Court
takes seven months to hand down a preliminary ruling, while it
normally takes from twelve to eighteen months to decide a direct
action. A major reason for this difference is that in suits seeking
preliminary rulings, the national judge has already established
the facts of the case. In view of the Court's growing workload, the
need for reforms which would release the Court from the cumbersome task of fact-finding has become increasingly compelling.u
Finally, the Court may have wanted to strengthen the power
of the Community's judicial branch to enforce more efficiently
the Community's laws in the Member States. The best approach,
the Court might well believe, would be for the courts of the Member States to assume the initial enforcement responsibility, with
the Court of Justice available for appeals. To encourage this development, the Court has joined its denials of direct access to
itself with liberal grants of access for individuals to national
courts-an access perhaps well beyond the anticipations of the
Treaty's Framers and beyond what the courts of the Member
States will always be willing to live up to. 18
That the Court is consciously trying to "federalize" the
courts of Member States has not been proved above, and probably cannot be proved at all. The Court probably refers to a need
for a cohesive hierarchy of Community courts which incorporates
those of the Member States when it talks about "bringing the
Community judicial system more into line with those of the
Member States. " 17
The Court thus apparently hopes to reserve for itself the role
of a supreme court of law to which appeals in the form of preliminary rulings under article 177 may be taken from rulings of lower
15. The Court heard 19 cases in 1957, 110 in 1974, 164 in 1977, and 156 during the
first six months of 1978. The number of decisions was 78 in 1975, 88 in 1976, 100 in l!J77,
and 60 during the first six months of 1978.
16. From the very outset, according to Stein and Vining, the Court has defined access
to national courts for the purpose of enforcing individual rights derived from Community
law in a most liberal way, one far beyond what may have been the intent of the authors
of the Treaty. They correctly see this as particularly appropriate to the "symbiotic Community system" (p. 124). The Court, however, occasionally has met with vehement resistance from some of the highest courts of the Member States; see, e.g., the decision in the
Cohn-Bendit case by the French Conseil d'Etat, Section du Contentieux, of Dec. 22, 1978
(refusal to enforce a provision of an EEC directive contrary to French law).
17. See text at note 15 supra.
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Community courts and of the courts of the Member States. Thus
far, the Court has answered all preliminary submissions from
domestic courts. In response to its growing caseload, however, the
Court might in the future be compelled to develop a practice of
dismissals of some requests for preliminary rulings on the ground
that no question has been raised under article 177, much as the
United States Supreme Court exercises its discretionary power.
CONCLUSION

Paradoxically, the courts of the Member States have become
the principal guardians of Community law. They have become so
much so that they are no longer free to follow their traditional
procedures for determining the applicability of national laws
when plaintiffs claim that those laws are inconsistent with the
Member State's Community obligations. 18 It is even fair to conclude that without the legal protection which the national courts
afford the citizen who seeks judicial review of Community legislation or administrative acts and the citizen who sues for damages,
Community law would be lettre morte. Whatever strong interests
the Court may have had in promoting this development, citizens
ought at least to have direct access to the Court in those meritorious cases where no national remedy is available, whether because of a lack of standing or simply because no remedy exists. 19
The Court could well be shaping a European system of appellate jurisdiction. While this may be a wise judicial policy, it undeniably and substantially departs from the structure envisaged
by the Framers of the European Communities.
18. It did so in Administrazione Delle Finanze v. Simmenthal, [1978) E.C.R. 629.
19. That the Court is acutely aware of this problem may be seen, in particular, in its
case law under article 178. This is the main reason why the Court apparently still hesitates
before it definitely settles the terms of its practice of dismissals.

